'tis folly in one Nation to look for disinterested favors from another--that it must pay with a portion of its Independence for whatever it may accept under that character…
--from George Washington's "Farewell Address" (1796)
Introduction
The success of Marshall Plan aid, relative to aid to less developed countries more recently, is partly attributable to differences between the groups of recipients. Western
Europe had huge advantages in putting aid to effective use. Unlike most aid recipients of subsequent decades, it had skilled labor, experienced managers and entrepreneurs, and a history of reasonably effective financial and judicial systems, and public administrations (Degnbol-Martinussen and Engberg-Pedersen, 2003: 288) . However, differences on the donor side also may have contributed to the Marshall Plan's greater success. Marshall
Plan recipients had to deal only with a single donor, in contrast to the dozens of bilateral and multilateral agencies and hundreds of NGOs in the aid business today. Also, Marshall Plan aid, "history's most successful structural adjustment program" (De Long and Eichengreen, 1993) , was not disbursed in the form of hundreds of separate donormanaged projects in each recipient nation. 1 Aid success stories in Taiwan, Botswana and Korea have also been attributed in part to the presence of a single or dominant donor (Brautigam, 2000; Azam, Devarajan and O'Connell, 2002) .
In contrast, recent recipients of development assistance interact with dozens of donors. The median number of official donors in recipient countries in 2000 was 23 (Acharya et al., 2003) . Morss (1984) as a share of GDP is actually lo wer than in most of Africa--accounting for over 8000 development projects (Acharya et al., 2003) . In the typical African country, aid is provided by "some thirty official donors in addition to several dozen international NGOs…through over a thousand distinct projects and several hundred resident foreign experts" (van de Walle, 1991: 58) . Thousands of quarterly project reports are submitted to multiple oversight agencies. Hundreds of missions monitor and evaluate these projects and programs annually in many recipients, and each mission expects to meet with key government officials and to obtain comments from officials on its reports (van de Walle and Johnston, 1996) .
Why might aid be more effective coming from a single or dominant donor? In a recip ient with many donors, each of which is responsible for only a small part of development assistance, responsibility for success or failure is diffused, and any single donor will rarely have much of a stake in the country's economic and social development (Belton, 2003) . Aid involves a set of collective action problems when there are multiple donors, each concerned with development in the recipient country, but with their own national goals as well, that sometimes detract from development objectives. Donors all have their own commercial and security objectives, and the internal political objective of maximizing aid budgets, which requires satisfying key domestic constituencies in parliament and among aid contractors and advocacy groups. This objective requires making the results of aid programs visible, quantifiable, and directly attributable to the donor's activities -even when doing so reduces the developmental impact of aid. Within a given recipient country, incentives for any one donor to shirk on activities that maximize overall development in favor of activities that contribute to donor-specific goals strengthen as the number of donors increases.
Because supplier cartels are typically created to raise the price of their products, donor coordination may be viewed as something inimical to the development of aid recipient countries. However, donors have a common interest in development, as well as their separate "private" goals which lead to practices such as tying aid, hiring away key government staff to run their projects, etc. "Collusion" by suppliers in this setting often can imply reducing rather than increasing the price of aid, and some forms of competition among donors can increase its price. Admittedly, donor cooperation sometimes takes the form of imposing unwelcome policy conditions, although even then government opposition is typically motivated more by concern over the rent-reducing effects of these policies than by any concern over adverse effects on poor people's welfare.
Costs associated with a proliferation of donors can be grouped into two broad categories. Some costs are primarily of a short-term and reversible nature, "merely" wasting resources unnecessarily. Tying aid to donor-country contractors has been estimated in an OECD study to reduce its real value by between 15% and 30% increase (Jepma, 1991) . Transactions costs associated with numerous and diverse donor rules and procedures for managing aid projects and programs, different languages and fiscal calendars, etc. (Berg, 1993: 81; UNDP, 2003: 148) can also be viewed as detracting from aid's value. 2 There is much duplication in "country analytic work" such as poverty assessments, public expenditure reviews, governance and investment climate assessments, and fiduciary analyses sponsored by donors (OECD, 2003: ch. 2) . Authors 2 Untying aid and standardizing and coordinating donor procedures would not necessarily increase the real resources to recipients, however, as political support for aid in donor countries might drop in response.
of these reports frequently are unaware of recent studies on the same topic in the same country funded by a different donor (Easterly, 2003: 15) .
The second category of costs is more insidious and long-lasting, involving donor practices that tend to undermine the quality of governance or retard the development of public sector capacity. A few examples of these practices include providing aid through projects rather than through budget support, bypassing central government units (for example, by the use of project implementation units), relying on expatriates instead of subsidizing "learning by doing" by hiring local staff, and funding investment projects that in the aggregate imply unrealistically high recurrent expenditures in future years. In the latter case, donors in effect treat the budget for recurrent expenditures as a common-pool resource (Brautigam, 2000) , producing a tragedy of the commons in which roads are built but not repaired, and schools are built but not staffed. These practices all increase the visibility of a donor's efforts, and the short-term appearance of success for its individual projects, but at the expense of coherent policy making and capacity building in the recipient country's public sector (World Bank, 1998: 84) . It is well-known in the aid business that however successful a project appears on its own terms, it will have little or no sustained impact in a poor sector-policy environment, and where it is not integrated into other donor-funded or government projects (Easterly, 2003: 7; Kanbur and Sandler, 1999: 29) . However, where there are numerous donors, any one of them would gain only a small share of the total benefits, in terms of project success, from efforts to improve administrative capacity in the country, which would in effect mostly be subsidizing the efforts of other donors.
The remainder of this paper examines in more detail another much-discussed practice of this sort, donor "poaching" of qualified local staff. Section 2 summarizes the related literature, including anecdotal evidence, and presents a simple formal model of poaching as a collective action problem among donors. Cross-country data for testing the model's predictions are described in section 3, with results reported in section 4. Results from these tests support the hypothesis that aid undermines quality of the government bureaucracy more severely in recipient countries where aid is fragmented among more donors. Section 5 summarizes and briefly suggests a few possible solutions, but notes the political difficulties in implementing them.
Poaching
Because of donors' need to show tangible results for their projects, excessive recourse is made to expatriate experts, especially long-term advisers. To the extent donors must work with counterparts in the local bureaucracy, these same pressures commonly lead donors to pay salary supplements to talented staff. This practice distorts incentives for civil servants to turn their attention away from their other responsibilitieseven those with greater impact on development--and towards the donor's projects (Arndt, 2000: 166-7) . It also creates incentives for officials to protect and extend aid projects from which they benefit, regardless of their merit, and for them to support perpetuating the practice of spending aid funds in the form of independent projects rather than in the form of coordinated, sector-wide programs or budget support (Acharya et al., 2003) . The distinction between purely private consulting work and quasi-official work associated with donor projects is often blurred (Cohen and Wheeler, 1997a: 142) .
Control of salary and manpower policy is eroded as donors hire local staff for 'their' projects or contract with them to meet donor needs. Dual salary and incentive structures undermine morale and commitment among public sector employees who are left out of donor-distributed assignments…This neglect or subversion of existing structures creates organizational confusion and contributes to the withering of government capacity (Berg, 1997: 82) .
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Examples in the aid literature come primarily from Sub-Saharan Africa:
In Niger, for instance, the majority of NGOs appear to be operated by moonlighting civil servants and ex-ministers of cabinet. In several cases, high-level officials left government to create NGOs in order to receive donor support that had once gone to the official's ministry (van de Walle, 2001: 165) .
Van de Walle and Johnston (1996) found that "…master's level staff in government earn
a fifth of what they could earn working for one of Nairobi's international management consulting firms or the resident mission of a donor agency." In Mozambique, a cleaner's salary in the international agencies sector was roughly equal to that of a national director in the civil service (Fallon and Pereira da Silva, 1994: 82) . Within project implementation units, salary benefits are often supplemented with access to vehicles and foreign travel for locally-recruited staff. Many middle and high-level African managers left the civil service to work directly for the aid agencies, lured by salaries often five to ten times higher than in the public service. In the early 1990s, a World Bank project hired Kenyan advisors, mostly from othe r government ministries, into the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock Development, at salaries of between $3,000 and $6,000 a month, compared with a total compensation package of approximately $250 available to a senior economist in the civil service (Wilson, 1993: 493) .
Many trainees from donor-funded training programs leave the public sector to work for aid agencies or NGOs, and the most talented, ambitious and best-trained are the most likely to leave. One study found that of twenty Kenyan economists receiving
Master's level training in a donor-funded capacity building project between 1977 and 1988, fifteen worked for aid agencies or NGOs directly, or for their projects by 1994.
The study's authors concluded that "elite external Master's degrees are, in effect, passports out of the public sector" (Cohen and Wheeler, 1997b: 312) .
These problems are particularly severe where donors' presence is large and skilled labor is extremely scarce. In Mozambique, Fallon and da Silva (1994: 95) report that in a labor force of 6.2 million, fewer than 2,500 has university degrees, and only 20 had doctorates.
A World Bank (1998: 88) report laments the fact that donors "unwittingly" raid the civil service of its best and brightest to run their projects. However, this and other donor practices with potentially damaging effects are widely acknowledged by the donor agencies themselves (World Bank, 2000: 20; 2003: ch. 11; UNDP, 2003: ch. 8 ). The problem is donor incentives, not lack of awareness. Fallon and da Silva (1994: 98) report that in Mozambique, one of the most aid-intensive countries:
Donor-driven competition for skilled personnel is creating immense problems for government. The preoccupation of many donors with ensuring that their local administrations have a full complement of qualified staff and with securing, at all costs, the manpower required to implement their projects is depriving the government of the capacity to effectively manage its administration.
Donors, in deciding whether to poach the better-qualified civil servants to run their own projects, treat the government bureaucracy as a common-pool resource. Where there are fewer donors, each with a larger share of projects adversely affected by deteriorating administrative capacity, the external costs from poaching may be sufficiently high for an individual donor to influence its decision. Even in this case, however, there may be principal-agent problems within a donor agency, as officials with primary responsibility for the success of a particular project may have an incentive to hire the best possible local staff, at the expense of the agency's broader objectives in the country.
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In principal, aid recipient governments could act to reduce the inefficiencies associated with competitive donor practices. They could always refuse some aid, 5 attempting to reduce the number of donors active in the country, or, at least, the number active in each sector. In practice, principal-agent problems within the recipient country, either between a government with short time horizons and its citizens, or between line ministries and central ministries (Wuyts, 1996: 742; van de Walle, 2001: 208) , often reduce the government's ability and interest in curtailing donor activities that are destructive for the long-run development of the country overall. For political leaders without sufficiently lengthy time horizons, the short-term personal benefits of corruption and patronage practices often outweigh the long-term costs of subverting administrative capacity (and judicial systems); insecure leaders treat the rational-legal order essential for development as a common-pool resource (van de Walle, 2001) .
The model below focuses on the collective action problem among donors. It abstracts from principal-agent or other collective action problems within the recipient government, and within individual donor agencies. These simplifying assumptions
should not be viewed, however, as attributing weak administrative capacity in aid recipients entirely to collective action failures among the donors. 4 Examples of intra -agency aid coordination problems are described in Wuyts (1996: 743) , Mosley and Eeckhout (2000: 141, 145) , and Whittington and Calhoun (1988: 301) . Also see OECD (2003: 108) . 5 Uganda's stated policy is to decline all offers of stand-alone donor projects (OECD, 2003: 121) . Eritrea also has a reputation for selectivity in accepting aid offers. 
The Model
All high-quality managers are equally productive and earn 
Denote the marginal product of 
Or, equivalently, 
Case I: "Selfish" Donor
Where d A = 0, donor d cares only about the success of its own projects, and the final term in (2.1) drops out:
The necessary first-order condition is:
Because the second term on the left-hand-side is equal to -γ , this expression can be rewritten as:
The 
or, equivalently: Optimality is ensured when either a single donor funds all projects in the country, or donors do not distinguish their own projects from other projects.
Case III: Imperfect Altruism
Where 0 < d A < 1, donor d places a positive weight on the success of other donor's projects, but places a greater weight on its own projects. From (2.1) the necessary first-order condition is:
Or, equivalently:
In this case, donors in the sector. Then, the first-order condition of (5) becomes: 
As before, 
From the necessary first-order condition, we obtain:
The number of projects other than i , N , is now inversely related to the marginal product of i M , and therefore positively to M is:
The derivative of 6.2 with respect to N is :
Therefore, the marginal product of i M increases, and when high-quality managers are homogeneous, supply responses might tend to equalize the quality of donor-employed and government-employed managers in the very long run.
Measuring Bureaucratic Quality, Donor Fragme ntation and Altruism
Predictions from the model imply that bureaucratic quality will erode more in recipients with greater donor fragmentation, i.e. a larger number of donors each with a smaller share of the project market. Bureaucratic quality can be measured by a subjective index available for most countries from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), a commercial service providing information on political risks to overseas investors and lenders.
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High scores on the ICRG bureaucratic quality variable indicate "autonomy from political pressure," "strength and expertise to govern without drastic changes in policy or interruptions in government services" when governments change, and "established mechanisms for recruiting and training." Because the ICRG ratings are subjective, and the definition is not very detailed, it is instructive to validate it against a more detailed "Weberian scale" of bureaucratic development from Evans and Rauch (1999 Kaufmann et al., 2003; Knack, 2003) the ICRG data are unique in covering the majority of nations over a relatively long period of time. The ICRG data have been published since 1982. The bureaucratic quality rating was provided on a 0-6 scale through 1998, and on a 0-4 scale thereafter. In the analysis below, ratings from 1999 onward are multiplied by 1.5 to make them comparable to the 1982-1997 ratings.
period 1970-90 as a whole about various dimensions of bureaucratic structure, including meritocratic recruitment, internal promotion, career stability, and competitiveness of salaries. From the 126 total responses, they constructed country-level averages for each variable. Finally, they construct a "Weberian scale" from 10 items reflecting competitiveness of salaries and attractiveness of public sector careers, relative to the private sector, number of years high officials have been in the civil service, use of civil service exams, etc.
The "Weberian scale" is correlated at .62 with the ICRG Bureaucratic quality index, averaged over all years through 1990 for which all data are available (see Figure   1 ). This relationship remains strongly significant when we control for per capita income, which in contrast to the Weberian scale is not a significant predictor of the ICRG measure when they are both included in a regression. 12 or later at .81, so these problems with the data may not matter much in practice.
Both fragmentation measures are equally subject to some criticisms. Most notably, neither donor expenditure shares nor project count shares necessarily accurately reflects its level of involvement and influence in a recipient's development program.
Neither measure distinguishes other characteristics of donors, only their "market shares."
One donor with a market share of 10% may undertake its activities in ways that are less intrusive and less institutionally corrosive than another donor with a similar share of aid. Deteriorating bureaucratic quality is predicted to be less severe in recipients where donors are more altruistic, in the sense that they value success of other donors' projects as much (or nearly as much) as their own. Multilateral donors are likely to be more altruistic in this sense than bilaterals for several reasons. First, multilaterals are funded mostly by the same donor countries that administer aid bilaterally. To the extent this creates overlapping accountability, an agency such as the World Bank may be more concerned about the success of projects funded by USAID, DfID, etc. than the latter agencies are concerned about each other's projects. Second, these donor nations set up multilateral agencies in part to make them less sensitive to the political pressures that often lead bilaterals to pursue objectives not fully consistent with those of recipient or other donor nations (Martens et al. 2002: 37, 47, 188-9; Degnbol-Martinussen and Engberg-Perdersen, 1999: 120, 128) . Finally, some multilaterals include recipient nations in their decision making. The activities of the UN's development agencies are less influenced by the specific national security and commercial interests of the bilateral donors, and recipient nations can exercise influence as members of these organizations (Degnbol-Martinussen and Engberg-Perdersen, 1999: 22; Martens et al. 2002: 192) . The share of aid from UN agencies, and from the international financial institutions (or IFIs, including the World Bank, IMF, and regional development banks) are therefore used as proxies for the degree of altruism among donors operating in the recipient country.
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Aid policy in a group of small "like-minded donors" --Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden -has differed from other bilateral donors in important ways. National defense, security and business motives are given less emphasis, in favor of humanitarian concerns and preferences for international cooperation (e.g., DegnbolMartinussen and Engberg-Perdersen, 1999: 89). 16 The share of aid from these five countries is therefore used as an additional proxy for donor altruism.
Empirical Tests
If donor fragmentation erodes bureaucratic quality, then countries with higher fragmentation should exhibit declining scores on the ICRG bureaucratic quality variable over time, relative to other countries. Accordingly, the dependent variable analyzed is the end of period (2001) value minus the initial (1982 for most countries, and 1984 for most others) value. 17 Control variables include aid levels, the initial level of bureaucratic quality, the length of the interval over which ICRG data are available for each country, populatio n growth, and per capita income growth.
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15 These arguments do not apply to EU aid, as decisions are made by serving politicians from member states, instead of by executive boards with genuinely devolved control. Unanimity in the EC Council and strong competition among EU member countries over contracts also differentiate the EU from other multilaterals (Martens et al. 2002: 37, 47, 192-3 ; also see Degnbol-Martinussen and Engberg-Perdersen, 1999: ch. 7). 16 Despite having "the most altruistic and progressive aid programs," these donors tend to "proliferate" their aid (scattering it across many recipients and thereby contributing to higher fragmentation) more than do other bilateral donors with a focus on former colonies or geo-strategic interests in a particular region (Acharya et al., 2003) . The fragmentation index should capture any negative impacts from this practice at the country level, however. Controlling for fragmentation, therefore, the share of aid from the like -minded donors is hypothesized to have positive effects.
Aid intensity --measured by ODA as a percentage of GNI, averaged over 1982-2000 --may affect bureaucratic quality independently of the fragmentation of aid among donors. 19 Aid could be a source of revenue used to increase public sector salaries, attracting and retaining more talented and experienced civil servants. It could also be delivered in the form of technical assistance designed to increase administrative capacity.
High aid levels can undermine public sector institutions, however (e.g., Brautigam, 2000) . Leaders with short time horizons will face little incentive to use aid to build a capable bureaucracy (Clague et al., 1996) , but instead may use aid for patronage purposes -for example by subsidizing employment in the public sector and in state-operated enterprises --to tighten their grip on power. As rents available to those controlling the government increase when aid levels are higher, resources devoted to obtaining political influence increase. 20 Workers face incentives to reallocate time away from acquiring productive knowledge and skills, toward gaining the knowledge and skills useful for obtaining a share of aid revenues. Talent is reallocated from productive to redistributive activities. By making control of the government a more valuable prize, aid can even increase political instability (Grossman 1992 Bureaucratic quality of governance may be influenced by numerous other factors such as religious or legal traditions, or colonial heritage (see Swamy et al. 2001; Treisman 2000; La Porta et al. 1999) . A convenient implication of using the change in bureaucratic quality as the dependent variable is that factors such as these which are invariant over very long periods of time are unlikely to matter much. In contrast, it is unlikely that quality of the bureaucracy would have fully adjusted to aid intensity and fragmentation already by the beginning of the sample period considered here, as donor proliferation began in earnest only in the 1970s and continued building up into the 1980s (Morss, 1984: 465 Results are shown in Table 1 . Equation 1 includes all aid recipients with initial per capita incomes (measured at purchasing power parity) below $7000, and with aid/GNI averaging more than .03%. Improvement in bureaucratic quality is associated with lower initial levels of bureaucratic quality, as expected, and with a longer time spell over which data on bureaucratic quality are available. Improvement is greater where GDP growth is higher, although significance of this relationship is marginal and causality likely goes in both directions (Chong and Calderon, 2000) . Both aid variables are significant: higher levels of aid, and greater fragmentation of aid (computed from project counts) are associated with larger declines in bureaucratic quality. A 12 percentage point increase in aid/GNI is associated with a half-point drop in quality of the bureaucracy 24 A similar-sized decrease in bureaucratic quality is associated with an increase of 30 in the 0-100 donor fragmentation index.
For many aid recipients in this 96-country sample, foreign assistance is sufficiently modest that there is little reason to expect the fragmentation of aid to matter much. For samples consisting of high-aid countries, fragmentation should matter more.
This result is confirmed in several tests (not reported in the 24 Using similar methodology and data, Knack (2001) found that higher aid levels were associated with declines in the quality of governance, as measured by an index of corruption, rule of law, and bureaucratic quality variables from the ICRG. Knack (forthcoming) found no evidence that higher aid levels promoted democratization, based on the Freedom House measures of political freedoms and civil liberties over the 1975-2000 and 1990-2000 periods. Neither study addresses donor fragmentation issues. 25 An alternative approach is to test in the full sample an interaction between aid/GNI and fragmentation. The coefficient for this interaction has the anticipated (negative) sign but is not significant. significant because its variation is reduced by the way the sample is constructed.
Fragmentation remains marginally significant, with a coefficient half again as large as in equation 1.
Equation 3 retains this high-aid sample, but substitutes the DAC-based fragmentation index for the AiDA-based index. This index also has a negative coefficient, significant at the .05 level.
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Causality is potentially an issue when examining the relationship between aid decisions and aspects of the quality of governance. Conceivably, donors may respond to deteriorating administrative capacity by increasing technical assistance and other forms of aid. If so, negative coefficients on aid variables in Table 1 could reflect the impact of bureaucratic quality on aid rather than the other way around. In general, however, donor policies at least nominally reward well-governed recipients with higher aid, not lower aid. 27 Consistent with these stated policies, tests correcting for potential endogeneity of aid produce higher (in absolute value) coefficients on aid/GNI, and indicate that causality runs from aid to the quality of governance (Knack, 2001 ).
In contrast to the case for aid/GNI, good exogenous instruments for donor fragme ntation are not available. However, there is intuitively even less reason to expect that the number of donors would increase in response to an observed deterioration in bureaucratic quality, than that aid levels would increase. Nevertheless, we conducted an informal causality test, taking advantage of our ability to construct DAC-based 26 Unlike the AiDA-based index, the DAC-based index is not significant for larger samples that include low-aid countries. 27 Examples include the World Bank's concessional aid to poorer aid recipients, USAID, and the soon-tobe-implemented U.S. Millenium Challenge Account. Aid allocation policies of UN and many other donor agencies do not intentionally penalize or reward recipients based on factors such as corruption levels and bureaucratic quality. These agencies sometimes may increase aid to countries with deteriorating economic conditions, which may in turn adversely affect bureaucratic quality, but inclusion of income per capita change as a regressor should capture this effect. to instit utional destruction from "poaching" and by-passing government, due to a short history of self-government, limited supplies of skilled labor, low incomes and public sector salaries, low foreign investment and high aid levels (Morss, 1984; Berg, 1997; Klitgaard, 1997; O'Connell and Soludo, 2001; Brautigam and Knack, forthcoming) . Table 1 .
In other tests not shown in tables, project proliferation -as measured by project counts from the AiDA database -was not associated with changes in bureaucratic quality. This result holds whether or no t one adjusts the project count totals for population differences (larger countries tend to have more projects). The lack of any relationship between project proliferation and declining bureaucratic quality is consistent with the ambiguous predictions of the model in section 3, but is inconsistent with the descriptive literature, which tends to blame equally project proliferation and donor fragmentation for undermining public sector administrative capacity.
The empirical relationship between donor fragmentation and declining bureaucratic quality shown in this section is consistent with the collective action failure model of the previous section, but is also consistent with a somewhat different model in Azam, Devarajan and O'Connell (2002) . In their model, high aid levels prevent institutional "learning by doing," for example in collecting taxes efficiently. Even if donors take full account of this negative externality of aid, a larger number of donors increases the likelihood a recipient chooses a high-aid, weak-institutions path -i.e.
"equilibrium aid dependence" -over the low-aid, strong-institutions alternative.
Intuitively, aid dependence is a riskier strategy for a recipient with access to aid from only one donor, while it is a more expensive policy for the latter than in a country with many donors.
Conclusions
This study provides a formal analysis and empirical evidence suggesting that competitive donor practices, where there are many small donors and no dominant donor, erode administrative capacity in recipient country governments. In their need to show results, donors each act to maximize performance of their own projects, and shirk on provision of the public sector human and organizational infrastructure essential for the country's overall long-term development.
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The decline in bureaucratic quality does not necessarily imply that donor practices are inefficient, if donors make better use of these human resources than does government.
There is no presumption that they do, however, unless donors are motivated purely by development concerns, or have a very high share of the aid market in a country.
Moreover, even if all donor-funded projects are well-managed and successful on their own terms, they may have no lasting development impact if administrative capacity is too weak. The resource injection from high donor salaries potentially has a positive net impact on development, despite the adverse impact on functioning of government.
However, the same benefits could be obtained witho ut the negative consequences from using the funds to increase salaries of underpaid civil servants, or through general budget support.
Easy solutions to the problems highlighted in this study are not apparent.
Ongoing efforts by aid agencies to improve donor coordination have focused to date on reducing transactions costs by harmonizing operational policies and procedures, such as standardizing reporting and monitoring systems, 30 and establishing a web site to disseminate information on completed and planned country analytic work 31 Changing donor practices that undermine institutional capacity are less amenable to technical solutions. Agreements between government and donors are needed on codes governing recruitment, salary and benefit levels, and the use of government officials for part-time 29 Bureaucratic quality has been linked to growth in several cross-country studies, including Evans and Rauch (1999) , and Keefer and Knack (1997) , who measure bureaucratic quality using ICRG data. consultancy work (Fallon and da Silva, 1994: 101) . Cohen and Wheeler (1997b: 318) recommend finding ways to tailor training to enhance carefully specified skills directly related to responsibilities within a ministry, without granting academic credentials that facilitate mobility. They also suggest reducing pay disparities by reducing overstaffed lower grades, and using savings to increase upper level salaries. They recognize, however, the potential for political resistance as overstaffing lower grades is a prime source of patronage (Cohen and Wheeler, 1997b: 320-321 ).
The analysis here also underscores the critical importance of organizational capacity building. In particular, multilateral and other agencies under fewer political constraints to demonstrate visible, attributable results should take on increased responsibility for technical assistance in upgrading policymaking, budgeting, and related administrative systems that tend to be victimized by collective action failures among donors. As capacity is improved, the plausibility of any efficiency rationale for project aid (by enabling the tracking of funds) diminishes, and donors may grudgingly accede to growing pressures from the DAC, UN and other international agencies to reduce the emphasis on "their" projects in favor of pooling funds in the form of budget support. Successful implementation of high-level decisions to employ more development-friendly aid modalities will require changing incentives for staff within donor agencies, for example by focusing more on output and country-level indicators, and less on input and project-level indicators. Staff performance appraisals could also take into account written evaluations of job performance from other donor staff, and from government counterparts (Whittington and Calhoun, 1988: 307 for this purpose, it can be inoculated somewhat from accusations of ignoring a major impediment to development. Norway and Sweden both fund education and health sector programs in Ethiopia, but Sweden is arranging to channel its health funding through Norway, while Norway will channel its education funding through Sweden (OECD, 2003: 97 ).
Competition at the global level among aid agencies also tends to inhibit specialization; for example the World Bank attempts to establish intellectual leadership in as many development themes and sectors as possible. Even the five relatively altruistic "like-minded" bilateral donors proliferate aid across many recipients, as a result of "good intentions" according to Acharaya et al. (2003) . 33 Good intentions, however, are a less plausible explanation for this sort of proliferation than the prestige and influence derived from aid agency officials from maintaining a global presence on par with the larger bilateral and multilateral agencies. In recent years, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden each have decided to focus their aid on fewer than 25 priority countries. An OECD (2001) review of Dutch aid policy lauded this concentration of aid as "a politically difficult and courageous step toward creating the conditions for more efficient development co-operation." However, the share of aid going to the priority countries has not increased markedly if at all in most cases, and aid is still provided to dozens of additional countries. Moreover, there is little or no specialization among the like-minded donors, as the high-priority list for each of them tends to include the same high-aid (Acharya et al., 2003) . 34 By contrast, India is not on the priority list for most of these donors, despite having more poor people (living on under $1 per day) in 2000 than all of Sub-Saharan Africa and a relatively favorable institutional 
